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Abstract 
 
This article has developed a new model of welfare dynamics under imperfect information or 
imperfect competition by introducing a new concept of “inefficient equilibrium”. If a country suffers 
from poverty, then the population of the country can be divided into two groups. For one group the 
fundamental welfare theorems are valid and for the other group the welfare is yet to achieve. The first 
group establishes an inefficient equilibrium with the second group. The institutions of an economy 
play very important role when these two groups interact with each other. This concept narrowly 
defines where government should work. This model is enhanced to describe a new ‘Market Model of 
Welfare Dynamics’ that our market is not uniform but distributed in layers of energy states. The 
probability of achieving Pareto efficiency decreases down along the market energy states. At the end, 
another new concept ‘Market Loop’ is defined to shed light on recent financial crisis and recession.  
 
 
Introduction 
 Development is a progressive process however the benefits of development do not touch many people 
whose contributions for development are no less than the contributions of the others. Welfare 
economics defined by the too generalized term ‘Pareto efficiency’ ignores those people. Theoretically 
‘Pareto efficiency’ is sufficient condition to describe welfare performance of an economy although it 
has little empirical relevance. Currently there have been two streams of thoughts about welfare 
economics. In one stream, the economists have focused on the theoretical elegance of the standard 
welfare theorems and in the other, the economists have denied the unrealistic set of assumptions 
behind the theorems but tried to work around them to develop a complementary model.  In this article, 
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a new welfare model under imperfect information or imperfect competition is defied in section three 
by introducing a new concept of “inefficient equilibrium” in section two. There is a tendency in every 
economy that part of its population, namely Pareto Efficient Coalition (PEC) may establish an 
inefficient equilibrium with the remaining population, namely Pareto Improvement Space (PIS) to 
ensure getting the benefits of economic growth more than that of efficient allocation of resources.  The 
new concept of inefficient equilibrium tells about how the PEC and the PIS co-exist in an economy.  
The concept of inefficient equilibrium is also a meeting point of neoclassical economics and 
institutional economics since within the PEC, institutions do not matter much but when the PEC and 
the PIS interacts with each other, institution matters very much. “Neoclassical economics is concerned 
with the operation of markets and on the other hand, new institutional economics is concerned with 
how markets develop (North, 1993)”. Ideally a dynamic market is the reflection of well functioning 
institutions. In view of this model, neoclassical economists may argue that the market has the potential 
to break the inefficiency barrier. On the other hand, institutional economists may argue that the market 
needs to be energized and guided by institutions to achieve that.  The concept of market dynamics is 
described in section four.   
Apart from the Pareto criterion, the issues concerning welfare were worked out earlier using the 
theories of compensation tests by Kaldor (1939) and Hick (1940) but those encountered overwhelming 
objections (Ng, 1984). Yew-Kwang Ng (1984) defined the term ‘quasi-Pareto improvement’, ‘in 
which for all levels of income, the average households were made better off  but the average 
households at any given level of income might be worse off’.  This model in fact, assumes ‘quasi-
Pareto improvement’ exists in every economic activity in various extents. It can explain the 
controversy of the first fundamental welfare theorem that why our resources are centripetally 
agglomerated while market has become more liberalized and more competitive. Even the lump-sum 
allocation from the government described in the second fundamental welfare theorem can not 
counteract this tendency. It is not plausible that the open and free market will make any better off the 
whole population of this world in terms of human value but will certainly make better off a part of the 
world population in terms of resources.  
  
 ` 
In real life economy, the term welfare means subsidy, cash benefits, free education or healthcare 
for the low income people provided by the government, which is quite opposite to the lump-sum 
allocation criteria described in the second welfare theorem. This article defines that the market is not 
uniformly distributed in an economy rather it is distributed in layers of centrifugally descending 
energy states. The market energy is defined here as the ability of a market to convert economic value 
into human value and human cost into economic cost. The probability of achieving Pareto efficiency 
decreases down along the market energy states. This article also shed light on why poor financial 
decisions of few investors may cause worldwide recession. A more sustainable solution of the 
financial crisis lies not in market biased Pareto improvement measures but in steady and aggressive 
unbiased Pareto improvement measures for the people positioned on the lower market energy states.  
  
A New Inefficient Equilibrium 
Much of the debates in economic literatures about welfare economics or general equilibrium theories 
are concerning their rigid assumption of ‘perfect information’. What does the term ‘perfect 
information’ mean? Let us begin with an example. X and Y are two individuals and they may choose 
either ‘High’ or ‘Low’ strategy to share information with each other. Let ƒ is the payoff profiles of 
respective strategies. If X takes ‘High’ strategy to share information with Y and Y takes conservative 
(‘Low’) strategy, then the corresponding payoffs of X and Y will be ƒ(XH) and ƒ(YL) respectively. If 
we assume that they have perfect information about the all possibilities of the game, then each of them 
will expect that that his opponent will follow the same strategy. The most likely outcome of this game 
will be two Nash equilibriums (Nash, 1951) where they choose the same combinations of strategies 
either (high, high) or (low, low) shown in Figure 01 and no unilateral deviation in strategy by X or Y 
is profitable. In this situation, theoretically the payoffs are the same for X and Y like ƒ (XH) = ƒ (YH) 
and ƒ (XL) = ƒ (YL). We may apply this outcome to our real world, where X is an employer and Y 
represents a worker. If the employer and the worker share information equally with each other, the 
worker will have to be paid equal to his contribution for whatever output he or she produce. If we 
consider that everyone wants to maximize his or her payoffs, then this game will reach to equilibrium 
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at (high, high). In this way we cannot explain how the capitalists are created in the world or how they 
have gathered their capitals from their once zero ownership (technology is not considered). Similarly 
the “perfect information” concept fails to explain the empirical behaviors of an economy as a whole.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
Without much thinking, it can be said that if X and Y both are business partners, then the (high, high) 
outcome will be realistic. Even if X is employer and Y is employee and their objective is to grow from 
a reference position, this outcome will also be realistic. In our real world, although individuals share 
information in any combination between low to high but from an individual perspective, the outcome 
of information sharing can be either win-win or win-lose. In case of win-win outcome, we may 
abstract the players of the game as a coalition. The individuals in a coalition are assumed to share the 
same level of information with each other and hold the same level of rationality.  
The term information asymmetry used in micro-economics that explains a situation of a 
transaction where one party has superior information compared to another. In our previous example, it 
can be considered that X and Y constitute a coalition A1 to win higher payoff than any other 
individual outside their coalition. If there is another player Z comes to play the game, he will have two 
options to choose from. They are, either is to merge with coalition A1 or is to compete with 
individuals X and Y. The possibility of merging depends on whether the win-win characteristic of 
coalition A1 will be undistorted after the merging or not. A merging requires equal sharing of 
Figure 01: Inefficient Equilibrium 
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information that eventually leads to efficient equilibrium. In case of efficient equilibrium, they will 
have Pareto efficient sharing of the output they produce together. For simplicity, let us assume that 
they have started with equal amount of property right or capital and therefore, they will have equal 
amount of payoff, say ‘M’. Otherwise, X and Y will try to dominate over Z in a way that they will be 
tuned up to share always ‘Low’ information with Z. As a result whatever strategy Z takes (high or 
low), X or Y will receive higher payoff than that of Z. That is, ƒ (XL) or ƒ (YL) > ƒ (ZH) and ƒ (XL) or 
ƒ (YL) > ƒ (ZL). If the payoff of Z is locally efficient as ƒ(ZH) is always greater than ƒ(ZL), this game 
will reach equilibrium at A1= ‘Low’ and Z= ‘High’ position (ƒ (XL) or ƒ (YL) > ƒ (ZH)). This will be 
an inefficient equilibrium in general since Z will always receive lower payoff than that of X or Y. 
More importantly, X and Y will receive higher payoff than that would be in case of efficient 
equilibrium. That is, ƒ (XL) or ƒ (YL) > M. On the other hand, Z will receive lower payoff than that 
would be in case of efficient equilibrium. That is, ƒ (ZH) < M.  The difference M- ƒ (ZH) will go to the 
coalition A1, which will be distributed between X and Y. In this example, X and Y will not allow 
many individuals to join in their coalition but will continue to playing the similar game with more and 
more individuals on the other side. This is how, a capitalist economy works and resources are 
agglomerated in the hand of few people. If there is another coalition A2, then A1 and A2 will compete 
with each other and as a result the individuals outside the coalitions will be benefited by getting higher 
payoff than before. If there is perfect competition, they will get the highest benefit. That is what said 
by the first law of fundamental welfare theorem. Unfortunately, before reaching to perfect 
competition, the game between A2 and A1 may end up in an inefficient equilibrium where one of 
them will dominate over or bias the other and they will form a biasing chain leaving the individuals 
outside the coalitions at the bottom.  
The above example has similarity with the example of sharecropping described as principal-agent 
problem by Greenwald and Stiglitz (1974b, 1986). They showed sharecropping was locally efficient 
equilibrium and quite different from general equilibrium model. The characteristics of inefficient 
equilibrium under asymmetric information also have much similarity with principal-agent problem 
since both are locally efficient but globally inefficient equilibriums. However, in principal agent 
problem, the agents and the principals are complements to each others. The agents are given incentives 
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and they are motivated to comply with the principals’ objectives. On the other hand, in this model of 
inefficient equilibrium, every individual is substitute to each other. Depending on level of information 
sharing, some of them form a coalition to achieve higher payoff than the others. The above example 
also shows that the problem of information asymmetry has evolved from the time dimension that 
economists often forget to consider. We have assumed that X and Y have superior information 
compared to Z since Z appears late to play this game. The individuals who are already in a coalition 
and those who are not are probabilistically apart from time perspective. If Z had appeared earlier than 
Y, then Z would have very high probability of taking the position of Y and vice versa. In summary, the 
concept of inefficient equilibrium can be applied for any number of individuals, even for the 
population of a country or of the whole word wherever information sharing strategies of few 
individuals shapes and limits actions and behaviors of many individuals.      
 
A New Welfare Model 
In this article, we will follow Arrow (1964) and Debreu (1959) and many other neoclassical 
economists to make micro-like macro-economics1. Macro economics has evolved from the basic 
problem of scarce resource. Information about scarcity deals with the problems of scarce resource. The 
inefficient equilibrium under information asymmetry can also be extended to model our macro 
economic problems based on scarce resources. For example, information about scarcity explains the 
situation why employed workers receive high wages while identical individuals are unemployed2. We 
may conclude that the employed workers establish an inefficient equilibrium with the unemployed 
individuals since the economy has certain capacity of employment under certain conditions. When the 
conditions will change, the employment capacity of the economy will also change. This concept of 
inefficient equilibrium can be applied to develop a more realistic model of economic welfare. 
The Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics lies with neoclassical economics on which the 
mainstream economists are divided into two groups. One group of the economists is stick with 
                                                           
1 ‘This appeared as point of debate whether we want to make micro-like macro or a macro-like micro’ (Stiglitz, 
1991). 
2 Stiglitz (2000) cited this example to explain information about scarcity.  
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restrictive assumptions of neoclassical economics, particularly of general equilibrium theory 
formalized by Arrow (1964) and Debreu (1959). The other group is skeptical about the neoclassical 
approach for its normative bias and unrealistic set of assumptions. I would like to call the first group as 
the optimists and the second group as the pessimists. The optimistic assumptions are used as 
foundation of general equilibrium theory like perfect information, complete set of markets, no 
enforcement problem and perfect competition. The optimists are induced by Adam Smith’s invisible 
hand proposition and perhaps they believe in ‘the market is always right’ principles. On the other 
hand, the pessimistic assumptions are just negating the optimistic assumptions like imperfect 
information, incomplete set of markets, imperfect competition and so on. The pessimists believe that 
the invisible hand is palsied or simply is not there (Stiglitz, 1991). However, they can not tell how we 
can measure the extent of imperfections or the extent up to which the imperfections affect the general 
equilibrium or the Pareto efficiency.  
The first welfare theorem states that ‘under certain conditions (optimistic) any competitive 
equilibrium is Pareto efficient’. The important assumptions include here complete market and price-
taking behavior of market. This theorem is considered as analytical confirmation of Adam Smith’s 
invisible hand hypothesis. However, Stiglitz (1991) argued “Smith was undoubtedly right that 
individuals’ pursuit of their private interest lead to social consequences ….but whether it leads to 
(Pareto) efficient outcomes is a far different manner”. On the other hand, Greenwald-Stiglitz (1986) 
showed that there would be (constrained) Pareto inefficiency of market economics with imperfect 
information and incomplete market. The underlying price assumption of the welfare theorems 
persuades the economists to become very much concerned about the efficiency properties of market. 
However, as Wicksell (1958) mentioned “Pareto efficiency and social optimum (welfare) need not be 
the same”. The economic literatures on welfare still have both the views, optimistic and pessimistic; 
they revolve around the validity of Pareto efficiency with respect to standard set of the Arrow-Debreu 
assumptions although empirical linkage of Pareto efficiency is matter of interpretation and judgment. 
They could not add much value toward solutions of our core economic problems like unemployment, 
inequality or poverty. 
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The second fundamental welfare theorem says that ‘under more stringent conditions (optimistic) 
every Pareto-optimal allocation can be sustainable by a competitive equilibrium after a suitable 
redistribution of initial endowments’. It necessitates involvement of government to vitalize 
competitive equilibrium by means of lump-sum taxes and subsidies. It says that we can separate out 
issues about efficiencies from the issues of equity although in real life we can not (Stiglitz, 1991). It 
also says that instead of focusing lots of externalities and factors, only limited government intervention 
can restore market failure and uphold market power. It ignores the history of market formation and 
institutional involvement where ‘invisible hand’ was crippled. For example, we see few individuals 
already have accumulated too much wealth and have got control of the market. They have the power 
even to influence the government to protect and uphold their interest. The government can only 
impose tax on them for a current year’s earning. In fact, this theorem has no empirical relevance other 
than prohibiting government from owning public goods or providing services that have price impacts 
on market but eventually let the wealthy people monopolize the market. In this context, the pessimists 
are right that ‘laissez-faire result in common bad rather than common good produces an intolerable 
degree of inequality’ (Feldman, 1987).  
Apart from these debates, I would like to take position between the pessimists and the optimists. 
Stiglitz (1991) rightly mentioned “the welfare theorems are just that: theorems, the conclusions of 
which follow inevitably from assumptions”. We see that the more global market is liberalized by 
means of free trade or open market, the more money is agglomerated in hands of fewer people leaving 
more and more people straggling with hunger and poverty. As Yunus (2006) mentioned “ninety four 
percent of the world income goes to 40 percent of the population while sixty percent of people live on 
only 6 per cent of world income. Half of the world population lives on two dollars a day. Over one 
billion people live on less than a dollar a day”. As also Feldman (1987) commented, “Some people are 
endowed with resources that make them rich, while others, through no fault of their own, are without”. 
The world has now two kinds of people. One is riding over the benefits of development or growth and 
another is receding in the race and stranded in spiral of hardships. In this case, it can be said that the 
people of the first kind establish an inefficient equilibrium with the second group as described in the 
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previous section to achieve more benefits of economic growth than that of efficient equilibrium The 
people of the second kind receive benefits less than that of inefficient equilibrium.  
The neoclassical assumptions are unrealistic for aggregation of the whole population of an 
economy. However, they may be valid for part of the population of an economy where they have win-
win relationship to share the outcomes. This part of population can be abstracted as a coalition. A 
coalition is valid as long as there is no conflict among the individuals to achieve their utility 
maximization goals. Every individual in a coalition can be assumed to share the same level of 
information. The assumptions concerning information have very important links with the other key 
assumptions in the mainstream economic theories (Stiglitz, 2000). Similarly by following neoclassical 
economics, it can also be imagined that the assumptions of the fundamental welfare theorems are valid 
for that part of the population but are not valid in general. That is, there exist perfect information 
sharing, perfect competition, complete set of markets and no enforcement problem within them. I 
would like to name this part as a Pareto efficient coalition (PEC). The PEC is an analytical abstraction 
where the concept of methodological individualism is valid and every individual share the benefits of 
development with each other in a defined manner without any further institutional intervention. On the 
other hand, the welfare is yet to achieve for the remaining population. I would like to name the 
remaining part as a Pareto Improvement Space (PIS). By complying with neoclassical economics for 
the PEC, we may say that institutions do not matter much within the PEC or the institutions work very 
well for the individuals belong to the PEC. However, institutions do matter outside the coalition when 
the PEC interacts with the PIS. By definition, the PEC establishes an inefficient equilibrium with the 
PIS. For onward discussion, let me call the term ‘inefficient equilibrium’ as Inefficient Welfare 
Equilibrium (IWE). The inefficiency is supposed to be reduced by institutional intervention. The 
concept of IWE narrowly defines where a government should work by means of re-distribution of 
resources, defining property right, policies, norms, law and orders and their enforcements and so on.   
Unfortunately, there are chances that the government is part of the PEC and in that case government 
support does not work beyond the IEB. There is no guarantee that the government is well functional 
rather there are equal chances that it may reinforce the inefficiency. This model also defines that the 
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individuals of the PEC has active involvement to create, run and control the institutions while the 
individuals of the PIS have mostly passive involvement. 
 
The Welfare Dynamics 
It can be concluded from above discussion that the PEC is separated from the PIS by means of an 
abstract boundary that may be called as the Inefficient Equilibrium Barrier (IEB). The IEB may also 
be interpreted from the view of institutional economics as IEB imposes transaction cost to the 
individuals in the PIS. If an individual in the PIS wants to enter the PEC by crossing the boundary, he 
or she will have to pay the transaction cost. A market is a place to produce commodities and also to 
provide wages to the producers to buy the commodities. This capacity of the market with respect to 
time for an average individual can be defined as ‘market energy’. The term ‘market energy’ is to be 
distinguished from the term ‘market potential’. In economic literatures the term market potential 
corresponds to a geographic location. For example Krugman (1992) defined market potential in terms 
of the weighted sum of purchasing power of all the regions under the market. A Pareto efficient 
economy has the same level of market energy across the economy. Similarly a coalition represents the 
same level of market energy for every individual in the coalition. In an incomplete or imperfect 
market, market energy will vary among different coalitions or among the individuals who have 
different levels of information sharing. However, market potential is independent of information 
sharing since that is calculated by aggregating the purchasing powers of different coalitions.  
Perfect information and complete market were never in existence in real world nor possible to 
exist in future but may be considered as expected characteristics of a market. Stiglitz (1991) described 
that imperfect information and incomplete markets alter the standard micro-economic results in 
fundamental ways. However, the extents of imperfections have differential existences in different 
markets in different time frames. Neoclassical economists believe in market power and ignore the role 
of institutions perhaps because they assume that the market has ability to override the institutions. On 
the other hand, the institutional economists believe in institutional dominance. “The polity that defines 
and enforces property right is more important and effective to shape economic performance of an 
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economy than competitive equilibrium” (North, 1991). It can be said that the institutions are there to 
energize, facilitate and guide the market. Combining both the economics, we may define that the IEB 
is the result of institutional failure to empower the market and market failure to bring the Pareto 
efficiency. If there were no IEB in an economy then the whole economy would become Pareto 
efficient.  
The first welfare theorem says that competitive equilibrium leads to an efficient allocation of 
resources. This can be interpreted in this model as the competition enhances market energy such that it 
weakens the IEB and eventually leads to Pareto optimality. As North (1993) described “Efficient 
markets are created in the real word when competition is strong enough via arbitrage”. That is, a 
competitive market can be attained through favorable institutional process and it may counteract the 
unfavorable institutions (unfavorable agreements and enforcement practice) and instigate them to 
change. In the extreme case, if there is perfect competition in an economy, the IEB will disappear and 
the economy will become Pareto efficient. This is how the concept of inefficient welfare equilibrium 
(IWE) modifies the first fundamental welfare theorem. In the real world, institutions changes through 
learning processes and therefore, they are quite slow to change. As a result, IEB will continue to exist 
even if competition increases in an economy.   
Amartya Sen (1993) described that the market mechanism promotes two aspects of individual 
freedom, namely ‘the opportunity aspect’ and the ‘process aspect’. The fundamental welfare theorems 
define only ‘allocation Pareto optimality’. Tadenuma & Xu (2002) extended the fundamental welfare 
theorems for two more optimality conditions, ‘opportunity Pareto optimality’ and ‘overall Pareto 
optimality’. The opportunity-Pareto optimality ‘reflects the situation in which it is impossible to 
improve one agent’s opportunities without reducing any other agent’s opportunities’. Every economy 
has started from a reference position and the position of IEB has moved to existing position through 
economic and political activities over time. Interestingly, the individuals of the PIS can be made better 
off without making the individuals of the PEC worse off if that do not interfere agglomeration of the 
resources on the PEC. However, it is not possible to distribute the resources already piled up on the 
PEC side since the IEB is preventing that to happen. Feldman (1987) pointed out “the first theorem 
ignored the basic distributional questions: how should unfair distributions of goods be made fair?” 
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Therefore, we may say that the PEC has an optimum size under certain conditions such as certain 
technological state, motivational state or availability of natural resources. The individuals in the PIS 
and the individuals in the PEC are substitutes and therefore, for example, if there is technical 
advancement, the capacity of the PEC will increase. In other words, there will be more opportunities in 
the economy and some individuals from the PIS will move to the PEC and the economy will reach to 
another inefficient equilibrium. This is how the position of the IEB is supposed to move further into 
the PIS because of technological advancement by creating new opportunities for an economy. 
In real world, the individuals who have better opportunities to acquire better skill, better 
employment opportunities also have more capacity to fulfill their demands than that of the others. We 
may imagine a compatible market corresponding to each side of the IEB. The market on the PEC side 
is more powerful than the market on the PIS since the PEC agglomerates the resources produced in the 
economy. In the context of the whole economy, it can be said that the overall market is biased toward 
the PEC Zaman (2008). According to the basic assumptions of neoclassical economics, when a market 
is biased, the market is failed. However, when we will use the term 'biasing', we can ask about the 
extent of the biasing whereas when we will use the term 'failure' it will not give any more information. 
The extent of biasing can be measured by comparing the market energy on PEC side with the market 
energy on PIS side. If both are equal, then there will be no biasing at all. If biasing is high then most of 
the benefits of economic growth will go to the PEC and the IEB will be further strengthened. On the 
other hand, if the PIS can hold much of the benefits they produce, the biasing will be low and the IEB 
will be weakened. In a market based economy it is supposed that price convey the relevant information 
(Hayek, 1945). I would disagree and therefore, I like to point out that price only convey biased 
information, not the actual information. Can we conclude that the top ranked box office movies are 
really the best movies? Or the life in big cities is more worthy than the life in rural areas? If an 
economy is heavily biased toward the PEC, the PIS will be affected by the biasing for whatever 
opportunities are created. This kind of opportunities can be called as ‘pseudo-opportunity’. Examples 
of pseudo-opportunities are the employments in the booming readymade garments sectors and in 
similar labour intensive manufacturing industries in Bangladesh where the workers are low paid and it 
is said that they are living no better than medieval slaves.  
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The concept of inefficient equilibrium and the second welfare theorem both take the same 
approach, called the market failure approach. The second fundamental theorem tells that Pareto 
efficiency can be restored by limited government intervention like lump-sum redistribution to the 
market and then the market will take over the rest of the responsibilities. On the other hand, the 
concept of inefficient equilibrium tells that market failure is inherent in every economy since the 
market structure can not change the institutions as a whole because of their slow responses. Therefore, 
the lump-sum allocation is not a panacea for solving poor economic performance. The inefficient 
equilibrium barrier is the demarcation where both the market and the institutions fail. I agree  with Ng 
(1984) that instead of  ‘Pareto social improvement’ we should say ‘quasi-Pareto social improvement’  
where ‘for all levels of income, the average household was made better off  but the average household 
at any given level of income might be worse off’.   
The abstraction of the IEB is absolutely subjective that depends on the discretion of the analyst. 
According to the definition of biasing strength, the more individuals are abstracted on the PEC side, 
the more the IEB will be strengthened. That means the strength of the IEB will be more in case of 
placing individuals having high income and mid income on the PEC side than in the case of putting 
individuals having high income only on the PEC side. Similarly the fewer individuals will be in the 
PEC, the more will be the market energy. By assuming compatible market energy in each case, we 
may imagine that the whole economy is distributed in layers of market energy states. The rich people 
are on the upper energy states and the poor people are on the lower energy states. The market energy is 
the highest at the centre and it gradually decreases away from the centre. Similarly the probability of 
Pareto efficiency is the highest at the centre and it becomes increasingly difficult to bring the Pareto 
efficiency away from the centre. There exists an inefficient equilibrium barrier between two market 
energy states. According to the definition of inefficient equilibrium, the interaction between two states 
is such that money goes up from lower energy state to upper energy state. Eventually money is 
agglomerated toward an imaginary centre from where market gains potential (for example, 
technological advancement) to centrifugally spread over the economy again Zaman (2006). This 
model can be described as “The Market Model of Welfare Dynamics”. This model substantiates 
Krugman’s (1992) Dynamic Spatial Model of economic geography where he described that economic 
  
 ` 
geography exhibit a tension between two kinds of forces: “Centripetal” forces that tend to pull 
economic activity into agglomerations, and “centrifugal” forces that tend to break such agglomerations 
up or limit their size. In an ideal economy having local market, entrepreneurs take the challenge to 
bear high wages and achieve good return. Therefore, they are supposed to diversify their investments  
   
 
by adopting new techniques and new strategies. However, in the open market global economy 
entrepreneurs do not necessarily produce products for their wage takers. Therefore, policy supports 
particularly by concerned government, for example, property right, tax credit are outmost important to 
define the balance between how much money will remain in lower energy state and how much will go 
up. The policy supports will act as catalyst to the centrifugal force.  
 
Market Loop 
The concept of capitalism tells that any new capital created in an economy should be distributed in 
accordance to the ownership of existing capital. However, the capitalists are not created at once. The 
above market model tells that the money that is unpaid to its contributor goes to the upper layer energy 
states from the lower layer energy states. From there the market centrifugal force powered by 
technology and competition is supposed to weaken the IEBs and to spread down by means of new 
products and services with resized prices. If the centrifugal force on the lower market energy states is 
very weak compared to that of on the upper market energy states, we may say that the market is 
Probability of 
Pareto 
efficiency 
decreases 
Figure 02: The Market Model of Welfare Dynamics 
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trapped within the upper markets. Then it makes a loop as shown in Figure 03 where the market 
dynamics circulates within upper layer markets. In a developing country where financial market is 
immature, a huge amount of idle money will circulate within the limited number of individuals and 
apparently the country will experience high inflation and corruption. A corrupted government official 
normally does not take bribe directly from a poor individual but takes from a rich contractor or 
businessman. In a corrupted economy, a huge amount of free money circulates on the upper layers, 
which again gives birth of money grabbers. Whatever is the way to gather money on the upper layer, 
the money mostly circulates among the pockets of the grabbers. There are fierce contentions among 
them to dominate over each other to grab and control of the institutions so that they can establish 
monopolistic decision making process to dictate the economy as per their interest and wish. Moreover, 
the individuals who are not corrupted but are supportive to this structure also get indirect raise of their 
salaries. Consequently, the net result is that the rich individuals become richer and costs of property 
ownership become high, increasingly unreachable to outermost layer individuals. A market loop 
inflates a market, especially land, property prices and stock prices and boost up financial business. The   
 
 
 
financial businesses are credit oriented and the mathematical models have been used for market 
modeling are based on unrealistic assumptions such as market always being in equilibrium 
(NewScientist, 2008). From the concept of market model we know that they consider only upper layer 
market, which is a partial view of the whole market and “ignore what is happening in the real world” 
Money 
goes up 
Market 
Loop 
Figure 03: Market Loop 
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(NewScientist, 2008).  Although analysis of the recent global financial crisis is out of scope of this 
paper but it can be told from the market model described in the previous section that why US financial 
market has become the one of the global financial agglomeration centers and therefore, poor financial 
decisions of few investors and managers have impacted the global market and lead to global recession. 
The market loop is not discovered at its initial stage because the money trapped in the market loop of 
upper market energy states is backed by certain flow of money from lower market energy states. If this 
flow is interrupted it does not show up because market loop continues with ‘mispricing’ and similar 
historic data and prediction. Moreover, when the market is unregulated, it becomes a black hole to 
absorb money until there is a colossal collapse as discovered recently in US mortgage market. In US it 
is estimated that this unregulated market grew astronomically from $900 million in 2000 to over $50 
trillion in 2008 (Murphy, 2008). Experts describe the mortgage market crack down as only a 
component and symptom of the deeper problem (Murphy, 2008). Mispricing in financial market is 
very common and unavoidable as long as businesses continue to grow. The global financial markets 
are interlinked and every other business is linked with financial business for their growth and 
therefore, the risks it runs become dependent on the risks of the financial market.  
 
Unbiased Pareto improvement 
The ultimate victims of any market loop are the individuals on the lower or outer layers market energy 
states of the market model. Their situation is further worsen by any financial crisis, recession or 
natural disaster and eventually more and more individuals fall down to down to the outermost layer 
and deep rooted poverty. The outermost layer is the true Pareto improvement space (PIS) separated 
from the rest of the economy by the toughest inefficient equilibrium barrier (IEB). A country is poor 
because it has got a very robust IEB for its outermost layer market that has developed gradually 
through many years of economic and political activities.  
 This article has an intention to focus on those people for whom the standard welfare theorems 
do not work well. The second fundamental welfare theorem tells that the government plays an 
essential role to keep alive the ‘invisible hand’. Unfortunately the ‘lump-sum distribution’ from 
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government may also get caught into the market loop. In a weakly organized government, the decision 
makers inside the government are part of the upper market and eventually the government reinforces 
the IEB. Most of the efforts for poverty alleviation whether by government or by non-government 
circulates within the market loop. Therefore, they are pretty stereotyped at functional level-the same 
work force, the same mindsets, the same processes but only paper works are different. However, every 
effort has a biased and an unbiased component. They can be named as Biased Pareto Improvement 
(BPI) and Unbiased Pareto Improvement (UPI) respectively. For example, Grameen Bank’s micro-
credit program for poor people is criticized for imposing very high interest rate but it is doing many 
good things that otherwise would not be possible. The part of interest that is perfectly converted into 
their human value out off the market process is the UPI for the economy. The remaining part is the 
BPI. The success of microcredit program is very much dependent on its unbiased component.  
The welfare programs in a developed country, for instance, in health and education sectors, also 
focus on the benefits of the low income people that are quire opposite to lump-sum allocation. If we 
consider the government as a player in the market not an independent body, we will see that the 
apparently equal access to health and education services are not equal in the sense that the net benefit 
goes to the low income people since they pay lower tax.  
A bright idea by Quadir (2003) called “bottom-up economics” proposed to nurture and promote 
entrepreneurship at the level of the poor people in developing countries like village phone program in 
Bangladesh or Stirling engine in Africa. Unfortunately those were small scale discrete efforts and 
failed to integrate with the existing markets since the existing market did not have enough incentives 
for that. To find a more realistic way for UPI, we may go back to the previous example in section 2. If 
another individual joins with Z and make a coalition A2, then they will gain more bargaining power to 
deal with coalition A1. As a result the inefficient equilibrium will be counteracted and IEB will be 
weakened. We may apply this concept for the outermost layer individuals of the ‘market model’ to 
make them a collective body so that their on-ward economic activities will have cumulative impact on 
the IEB to weaken its strength Zaman (2001).  
We are so far concerned about only quantitative growth only but the development has a qualitative 
aspect too. Although it is true that an underdeveloped country has fastened with corruptions, poverty 
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and undignified values but it also to be noted that good values and high growth may take different 
paths and independent efforts. A developed country have got frustrated young generations and 
degraded cultural and social values too. Environmental declination is another issue for which 
developed countries are mostly responsible. The individuals who are the ultimate sufferers of the 
above problems are to be isolated in a coalition and the problem areas are to be set with some local 
quantitative or qualitative bench marks. Unbiased Pareto improvement measures can directly improve 
the local bench marks that eventually will improve macro economic or global bench marks.  
       
Conclusion 
Development has a human aspect. If the fundamental welfare theorems are valid for a certain range, 
competition may not take care of human value. For example, competition is good but we need to 
evaluate whether the competition is for transforming all of our milks into candy or for keeping the 
milk as much as possible for our kids. The concept of inefficient equilibrium provides an analytical 
framework beyond standard welfare model. It also tells that a sustainable solution of any financial 
crisis not only lies in financial measures but also lies in non-financial measures. Nevertheless poverty 
is the biggest challenge to us. Prahald (2002) shown that there will be two possible scenarios for the 
evolution of global market in coming 15 years: the 1 Billion Market and the 4 Billion Market. The 
standard welfare theorems may be valid for the 1 Billion. This article is intended for the later.  
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